

# National Progress Report Federal Republic of GERMANY

*(as of 12 March, 2012)*

**Introductory remark:** Germany, like many other long-term users of peaceful nuclear energy applications, had already achieved a high level of nuclear security well before the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 2010. This national progress report therefore only describes the additional achievements since then.

**1. (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material /CPPNM)** Germany ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM on 21 October 2010 and supported all international efforts to reach the quorum for its entry into force.

**2. (UNSCR 1540)** Germany remains fully committed to implementing the obligations deriving from UNSCR 1540 on the national level. In May 2010, it issued the latest update of its national report to the UN Security Council. It continues to encourage, and, where appropriate and feasible, to assist, other states in implementing UNSCR 1540.

**3. (Contribute Towards the IAEA Nuclear Security-Related Activities)** In 2010 and 2011 Germany and the IAEA jointly implemented/allocated 8.4 m euros of Germany's total pledge of 10 m euros to the **IAEA's nuclear security fund** in agreements partly on securing orphan and disused radioactive sources, on setting up a global inventory of radioactive sources and on establishing a postgraduate curriculum in nuclear security, partly on equipment and technical infrastructure for the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. Germany also actively participated in the drafting of documents of the IAEA's Nuclear Security Series (3 recommendations and the so-called essential elements) and in the regulatory framework for cyber security.

**4. (Support Nuclear Security-Related International Initiatives)** Germany attended the GICNT Plenary Meeting on June 29-30, 2011, in Daejeon, ROK. In cooperation with the EU Commission Germany in May 2011 organized a **GICNT** workshop on core capabilities in Nuclear Forensics at the Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany. Germany continued to make large-scale contributions to its **G-8 Global Partnership** projects in Russia. Nuclear security is improved there mainly in the fields of dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines of Russia's Northern fleet and the securing of sensitive nuclear installations and materials.

**5. (Improve National Nuclear Security regulatory framework)** After a thorough evaluation of its national nuclear security regulatory framework a concept for further securing intermediate storage has been elaborated taking into account new technical findings.

**6. (Enhance National Nuclear Security Culture)** With regard to the human dimension Germany has recently also focused its updating of nuclear safety regulations to include the interfaces man – technology – organization. The

regulatory framework for the professional training of technical personnel in nuclear power plants will be adapted accordingly. At the same time training and education for personnel in nuclear facilities increasingly follow an integrated approach to assure nuclear safety and security equally.

**7. (Enhance Efforts in Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radiological Materials)** Germany has taken part in international information sharing on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through the participation in the IAEA ITDB, IAEA NUSEC, and GICNT IAG. The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) closely cooperates in the framework of Interpol's project "Geiger" and the common Interpol/Europol project "Rutherford", both relating to illicit trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials. In 2011 the installation of a special CBRN reporting scheme for police and customs has been decided, which will be implemented from mid-2012.

**8. (Strengthen National Nuclear and Radiological Material Security System)** Germany attaches great importance to minimizing the risks related to the legitimate use of radiological and other radioactive materials. It applies nuclear security measures, including transport security measures, in accordance with the CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In order to implement EU Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom, which demands strict control of each "High Activity Sealed Source" from manufacturing to the final disposal, a central register was established in Germany. It ensures comprehensive traceability of these sources, thus making it possible to ascertain their whereabouts at any time.